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BARGAINING POWER IN THE SHADOW
OF THE LAW: COMMENTARY TO
PROFESSORS WRIGHT AND ENGEN,
PROFESSOR BIRKE, AND JOSH BOWERS
DANIEL D. BARNHIZER*
This essay approaches the subject of plea bargaining as a general
topic and also contains my commentary on papers presented by
Professors Wright and Engen, Professor Birke, and Josh Bowers
specifically. It does so with some trepidation. My scholarship and
teaching focuses upon contracts and negotiation. Plea bargaining, on its
face, doesn't immediately seem to fit within the classical contracts
paradigm of informed and voluntary offer, acceptance, and
consideration. At the theoretical level, at least, the classical model of
contract envisions parties of roughly equal bargaining power voluntarily
negotiating the terms of their bargain. Against this theoretical
background of a deal struck between persons in a posture of rough
parity, criminal law, in contrast, is deeply suspect. The resulting
agreements likely would not survive in many civil litigations based upon
factors such as duress, unconscionability, fraud, incapacity,
incompetence, undue influence, frustration of purpose, and mistake. In
the criminal context, one of the parties has all the resources of the state,
and the other often has no meaningful resources. In the criminal
context, one party threatens force and deprivation of liberty if the other
does not submit to the proposed exchange. In the criminal context, one
party possesses a host of alternatives and may cheaply impose additional
risks and costs upon the other merely by exercising relatively unfettered
discretion with respect to the charge against the accused. Over-
indictment provides prosecutors with a powerful tool to intimidate
noncooperative defendants or defense counsel, even if it is rarely used.
Indeed, from a contract law standpoint, it is difficult to think of plea
* Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I am grateful
to Andrea Schneider and Michael O'Hear for their invitation to participate in this
symposium. Likewise, I am honored by the opportunity to comment upon the papers
delivered by Professors Ronald F. Wright and Rodney L. Engen, Professor Richard Birke,
and Josh Bowers. Both the symposium and the detailed interactions I have had with these
three papers have been immensely enriching.
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bargains as "contracts" in any sense.
But once we retreat from the unreality of the classical model of
contract negotiation and formation, the dynamics of criminal plea
bargaining can provide important insights for civil contract disputes and,
I hope, vice versa. The problem with criminal plea negotiations isn't
really that the resulting agreements aren't contracts. It is that the power
relationship between the parties appears so one-sided that even
innocent parties may have strong incentives to accept a guilty plea
rather than face trial-their best, worst, and only alternative to a
negotiated agreement. Such agreements are, in fact, merely one more
point on a continuum of bargaining, promissory, and contractual
relationships based upon the relative bargaining power of the parties.
As I have argued elsewhere, the question of whether a promise or
agreement should be enforceable under contract law depends entirely
upon whether both parties to the transaction possessed bargaining
power of a type that courts can consistently and credibly identify.'
Because of the blatant power disparities between prosecutor and
accused, my own work predicts the regulation of such agreements under
a set of safeguards that exist outside the domain of contract law. These
include representation of the accused by counsel, constitutional
guarantees, and judicial review of the terms of the agreement and (at
least superficially) the actual consent of the parties. Such safeguards are
distinct from classical contract law models that presume private
1. LARRY A. DIMATrEO, ROBERT A. PRENTICE, BLAKE D. MORANT & DANIEL D.
BARNHIZER, VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND
INTERPRETATION 121 (2007) [Chapter 6 hereinafter BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS
CONTRACT THEORY].
On a macro level, removed from individual cases, bargaining power
operates as the cover charge to the exclusive club of contract law. When
both parties to a transaction possess some ability to affect the outcome of
their interaction, they may take advantage of the relatively flexible and
unregulated regime of private contract. If one party lacks bargaining
power-as in cases of duress and coercion-or even if that party has real
bargaining power but legal decision makers cannot consistently and
credibly identify and assess that power-as with intrafamilial gifts-the
parties cannot make promises that are enforceable as contracts. Instead,
their transaction gets bounced to one of many alternative venues, such as
labor law, tort, promissory estoppel, criminal law, or property, in which
the bargaining process and even the terms of their interaction are subject
to steadily greater degrees of public regulation. Bargaining power thus
works to move promises along a continuum from strong private autonomy
to strong state intervention.
Id. at 121.
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autonomy and private orderings in which the abuse of state power is
usually not a direct concern.
2
Moreover, despite generating a comforting warm glow of objective,
formalist, Langdellian certainty, classical contract law provides a poor
model against which to analyze the dynamics of criminal plea bargaining
and the contributions by the four authors whose papers are the subject
of this essay. Rather, plea bargaining generally, and these three papers
specifically, provide strong analogies and points of similarity to the
reality of modern contract practice based upon transactions pursuant to
standard form contracts-often adhesive in nature-between producers
and consumers.
My argument is based upon a model of prosecutors as nothing more
(and nothing less) than producers and producers' agents, who offer an
array of products and services for sale to their customers through
standard form contracts. Their customers, of course, comprise
defendants, defense counsel, judges, and the non-criminal and
potentially criminal public. As with many standard form contracts, the
criminal plea bargain also provides in some cases for dickering over
salient terms such as price, optional features, and time and place of
delivery.
In the real world, standard form agreements between producers and
consumers likely now describe more than ninety-nine percent of all
contractual interactions.4  Parties to such agreements rarely, if ever,
2. See id. at 126-30.
By moving transaction types characterized by systemic inequalities of
bargaining power along a continuum away from "core" contract law and
relatively unfettered private autonomy toward regimes involving greater
degrees of public intervention, courts and legislatures express indirectly
the permissible boundaries within which parties may exercise legitimate
forms of bargaining power.
Id. at 128.
3. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 23-26 (1996). A producer is one who produces goods
and services for sale, while a consumer is an individual, business firm, or other organization
that purchases such goods and services in order to consume them. Id. at 24. In the
commercial context, any entity may be a producer or a consumer depending upon the
transaction. In the criminal plea bargaining context, of course, prosecutors will virtually
always occupy the producer position, and criminal defendants, potential criminal defendants,
the community at large, and the police will be consumers of the prosecutor's products.
4. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) ("Standard form contracts probably account for
more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made."); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203
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stand on an equal footing with respect to their relative bargaining
power. Producers-sellers of goods and services-almost always have
superior information regarding their products, contract terms, and their
pricing structure. This information advantage, in turn, creates a
ubiquitous bargaining power advantage over consumers of those goods
and services An auto manufacturer, for example, designs, builds, tests,
and deals with consumer complaints regarding its products and
possesses greater information about the strengths and weaknesses of its
products than consumers. Moreover, the auto manufacturer also
possesses superior information regarding the terms of its standard form
contracts, and the likelihood and actual value of particular aspects of
those contracts such as warranty terms and choice of forum clauses.6 A
consumer cannot afford to investigate the reliability of every physical
component of the vehicle.7 Nor do consumers bother spending time
reading or attempting to vary non-salient terms of the manufacturer's
contract.
As repeat players in transactions regarding sales of their products,
producers have incentives to develop information not just about their
products but also about consumers themselves.8 Particularly in the
information age, consumers voluntarily-and usually unknowingly-
(2003).
5. See SLAWSON, supra note 3, at 23-27. According to Slawson, this informational
advantage is a natural consequence of the fact that producers only have to have information
about their own products, while consumers must spend scarce resources investigating and
analyzing characteristics of many products and producers. Id. at 26.
6. See id. at 23-27.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and
Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, 70-71 (2006).
Specifically, producers in the information era have the ability to collect
extraordinarily detailed personal information about individual consumers
and then use that data to develop a high-definition electronic double-a
doppelganger--of those individuals. Producers can then use this
electronic reflection of a consumer's interests, wants, habits and needs, to
invade a consumer's control over personal choices and interests. The
doppelganger identifies the targets most susceptible to particular products
and pitches, assists the producer in making the sale, and perhaps even
suggests means of exploiting known cognitive biases that can interfere
with free and rational choice by the consumer. And, most importantly,
the doppelganger is the property of the producer or data miner who
created it-individual consumers currently have no power to restrict or
control others' uses of these electronic manifestations of their selves.
Id. at 70-71.
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give away personal information in terms of web browsing and shopping
histories, website registrations, warranty registrations, frequent shopper
cards, contest entries, and a host of other privacy invasions.9 Producers,
in turn, develop this information or purchase it from data miners for the
purpose of crafting detailed electronic doppelgangers of consumers.
With the assistance of such virtual doubles, producers can target
consumers individually or collectively to exploit known wants,
preferences, and weaknesses and increase the likelihood of successful
future sales.'0  Importantly, this personal information belongs to
producers, and consumers lose all ability to restrict producer use of this
information once it has been surrendered."
Consumers do possess some defenses or countermeasures against
producer bargaining power advantages. First, consumers are
heterogeneous and possess widely varying degrees of sophistication,
interest in particular transactions, access to information about a product
or producer, and willingness to engage in shopping or bargaining.'
2
Sophisticated individual consumers may possess, or invest in developing,
information with respect to producers or products that, while unlikely to
counteract completely the systemic advantages of producers,
nonetheless protect against extreme abuses of bargaining power.
Likewise, sophisticated consumers may recognize the value of third
party assistance and expertise in shopping and bargaining for large-scale
transactions. In contrast, individuals at the other end of the spectrum
lack the sophistication, resources, or practical ability to affect
meaningfully the outcome of the bargaining process. While all
consumers possess some bargaining power-the ability to affect a
preferred outcome in the bargaining transaction-that power may not
be legally cognizable in that courts are incapable of credibly and
consistently observing and policing that bargaining power. 3 In such
situations, the parties' agreement is unenforceable under contract law
and must be regulated under some other paradigm such as family law,
9. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2060-68 (2004) (analyzing four case studies of methods by which consumers voluntarily
and involuntarily generate personal information for commodification and sale by producers);
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283-84
(2000) (listing a broad array of mechanisms by which producers collect information from
individuals' transactional lives).
10. See Barnhizer, supra note 8, at 90-92.
11. See Litman, supra note 9, at 1284.
12. Barnhizer, supra note 8, at 92-101.
13. See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 1, at
129-33.
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property law, or criminal law.
Second, by virtue of their limited resources, consumers are rationally
ignorant or boundedly rational regarding the merits of any given
transaction.1 4 Consequently, they tend to rely upon surrogates for actual
information about products such as producer reputation or heuristics for
lowering the costs of the decision making process." Sophisticated
producers can expend resources improving, maintaining, and
manipulating their reputations and in exploiting known heuristics and
cognitive biases of consumers. Producers in such situations likewise
may have incentives to impose inefficient standard form terms upon
consumers, knowing that consumers are unlikely to have sufficient
information or bargaining power to identify or negotiate away from such
terms.
This model of modern, information era, standard form contracting
practices fits well with the dynamics of criminal plea bargaining in
general and with the insights offered by Wright and Engen, Birke, and
Bowers. Prosecutors, viewed from the lens of contract law and
negotiation theory, are producers of a particular product-criminal
prosecutions. Prosecutors offer their product in a variety of models
ranging from a full blown criminal trial (with optional state and federal
appeals for an additional fee), to a plea agreement that purportedly
manages the risks of going to trial, to a decision not to indict or charge
the defendant. The standard terms of such contracts are contained in
federal, state, and municipal criminal codes, rules of criminal procedure,
and office norms and practices. Finally, consumers of the prosecutor's
product can bargain only over certain salient terms, such as sentence
length or degree of charge.
In this system, prosecutors possess superior information regarding
their products than their consumers, and consumers come with varying
degrees of sophistication and resources. Given that criminal
prosecutions are large-scale transactions in the lives of most criminal
defendant consumers, third party advice, negotiation, and brokerage
services are typically available and usually required. Thus, criminal
defendant consumers must depend upon defense counsel to advise and
negotiate a plea agreement, despite that such parties often have their
14. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 214-22 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003) (describing consumers as "boundedly
rational decisionmakers who will normally price only a limited number of product attributes
as part of their purchase decision.").
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own agendas and interests and may themselves be consumers of the
products offered by the prosecutor. And finally, criminal defendant
consumers necessarily rely upon surrogates for full information
regarding the product such as producer reputation and heuristics and
cognitive biases that are often less than fully rational.
As discussed more fully below, each of the articles addressed in this
commentary essay offers useful and important insights into the
bargaining dynamics underlying the transaction between prosecutor and
criminal in the plea agreement process.
I. CHARGE MOVEMENT AND THEORIES OF PROSECUTORS BY
PROFESSORS WRIGHT AND ENGEN
In Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors,6 Professors
Wright and Engen illustrate the similarities between plea bargaining and
standard form contracting in two important respects. First, their
analysis of the relationship between charge depth and the ability of
parties to reach more easily a customized, preferred outcome parallels
the strange tension between standardization and customization of
boilerplate terms in an information-based transactional context. 7
Second, their models of prosecutor as agent and the goals of that agent
in the bargaining process illustrate how even in a regime of high degrees
of term standardization, individual bargaining agents can still
manipulate the process to respond to their individual goals and,
probably to a lesser extent, the goals of their bargaining partnership
with defense counsel.
Professors Wright and Engen begin with a theory of charge
movement that explains to some extent the relative "stickiness" or
psychological inertia of the standard terms available for plea bargains
for some crimes (such as kidnapping) and the relative fluidity of
standard terms in other situations (such as assault).'8 Wright and Engen
propose that the relative "depth" of charges available in a criminal code
at least partly determines the likelihood of charge movement in plea
bargaining.' 9 Thus, in the context of kidnapping, the criminal code
16. Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of
Prosecutors, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2007).
17. See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1126-27 (2002) (arguing the impossibility of wholly
standardized or wholly customized transactions).
18. Wright & Engen, supra note 16, at 16, 19-24.
19. Id. at 16-17.
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provides a relatively limited menu of standard terms over which the
prosecutor and defense counsel can bargain. Because of the relatively
high cost of dropping the charge from a more serious crime to a less
serious offense, the initially proposed terms are more likely to be, in
Russell Korobkin's terms, "sticky."2 °  In other words, just as in
commercial bargains, once a standardized term is proffered as the
default term, the parties incur a psychological cost to move off of that
initial position. Prosecutors, as offerors of the initial default terms,
should move off of that initial standard term where the benefits-
defined in terms of increased attainment of enforcement goals, office
policies, personal goals, or some other metric-exceed the costs,
including the psychological and reputational costs of doing so."
The interaction between the initial charging decision and later
charge movement through plea bargaining should reflect this inertia.
Where a prosecutor asserts an initial charge in a deep charge context,
such as Wright and Engen's many varieties of assault-based crimes, both
parties are aware that it is a low-value default position. The costs to the
prosecutor to agree to each level of downward departure are relatively
low compared to those in a shallow charge context.22 Consequently,
prosecutors should be relatively less concerned with initial charging
decisions in deep charge level contexts because they know that they can
bargain off those positions with little cost. In essence, the initial charge
decision in such situations should, according to this model, more nearly
resemble a statement that, "if you are interested in this product, here
are a range of available options, and maybe we can talk some on the
price.
'
,
21
The deep charge level context, such as assault, thus resembles in
some respects the a la carte computerized contracting paradigm
proposed by Margaret Jane Radin in which she suggests that, because of
reduced information costs, Internet-based producers could theoretically
provide consumers with a smorgasbord of boilerplate terms. The
20. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584, 1608
(1998) ("The psychological power of inertia suggests that negotiators who are able to define
the status quo position, against which all proposed terms are judged, are likely to enjoy an
important bargaining advantage.").
21. See Wright & Engen, supra note 16, at 29-30.
22. See id. at 17.
23. The temptation to discuss pleas by conspirators as "trade-ins" in which they rat out
their co-actors is nearly overwhelming, but likely exceeds the scope of this analogy and the
bounds of good taste.
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consumer identifies a product she wants to buy, and the producer
provides a menu of standardized terms. The producer dictates the array
of terms and the prices of each standard term, but a consumer who
values, say, retaining the right to litigate rather than arbitrate, could
check an appropriate box in an online form and pay an additional fee to
have a different but still standardized choice of forum or choice of law
clause inserted into the contract.24  This type of bargaining is
theoretically possible only in situations in which the producer has good
information regarding the cost of each different combination of
standard terms. While some information, like the cost of
manufacturing, is solely within the producer's control, other types of
information require a large number of repeat transactions, such as the
likelihood of warranty claims and the costs of litigating versus
arbitrating. Consequently, a la carte contracting over boilerplate terms
is theoretically possible only in situations where producers have a large
number of very similar transactions, which is exactly what we should
expect to see in deep charge level contexts such as assault.
In contrast, in shallow charge level contexts, prosecutors should
theoretically be more cautious in making initial charge and charge
bargaining decisions because both they and defense counsel lack finely-
grained information and nuanced menu options to move from that
charge. In the former case, the difference is akin to a consumer hoping
to buy a Chevy Malibu and dickering or purchasing different options
such as an extended warranty and sunroof versus being offered the
choice between a fully loaded Corvette and the Malibu. In the latter
situation, as Wright and Engen observe, it is more difficult to negotiate a
plausible movement from the prosecutor's initial offer to the defense's
24. See Radin, supra note 17, at 1144.
[C]ustomization of terms and conditions is possible. Instead of a take-it-
or-leave-it set of fine print terms, a website could offer a menu of choices
for various clauses, and the user could check boxes for which ones were
desired. One might choose the warranty disclaimer (free) or the two-year
warranty (pay $1 extra); one might choose to accede to the arbitration
clause (free) or the clause allowing litigation in one's home state (pay $2
extra).
This kind of customization of terms offline is, to some extent, already
apparent (purchasing service contracts or extended warranties on big-
ticket items, for example). It would be inexpensive to do the same thing
online even for small transactions ....
Id. at 1144.
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preferred position.25
Given that some criminal charge categories-such as kidnapping and
murder-are relatively shallow compared to others such as assault, an
important question is why the consumers of criminal law have not
demanded a regularizing shift in one direction or the other. At first
blush, defense counsels, as the most immediate group of consumers of
criminal law, should prefer to operate in a deep charge context in which
they can demonstrate to themselves and their clients that they provide
value in the exchange by more often obtaining downward movements
from prosecutors' initial charge decisions or threats. On the other hand,
the relative depth of different criminal charge categories may represent
an unconscious moral judgment by other criminal law and plea
bargaining consumers, including the non-criminal-defendant public and
legislatures, that some types of crimes are so serious and extraordinary
that they demand special attention. In such situations, the shallowness
of the criminal code normatively makes both the initial charging
decision and downward charging departures more difficult and costly for
the decision maker-the prosecutor-by increasing the cost of the
psychological luxury of splitting the baby. Just as producers of luxury
goods use the structure of their menus of standard terms (including
price, warranty, service, and actual characteristics of the products) to
differentiate luxury goods from more run-of-the-mill products, the
shallowness of the criminal code morally differentiates "special" crimes
like kidnapping and murder from more common crimes such as assault.
This attempt, whether purposeful or not, to structure criminal codes
to force prosecutorial decision makers to consider initial charges and
charge movements more carefully in some circumstances may be
relevant to whether the charge movement phenomenon is normatively
positive, neutral, or negative. The second part of the Charge Movement
article explores the normative impact of the deep or shallow structure of
the criminal codes on different theories of prosecutorial decision
makers. Broadly, Professors Wright and Engen identify two
characterizations of prosecutorial decision making. First, prosecutors
may be viewed as individuals with subjective discretion to pursue
individual goals such as crime control, crime punishment, or more
personal goals.26 Second, prosecutors may be characterized as being
part of a highly-connected network of supervisors, police, communities,
25. Cf ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 177 (2d ed. 1991) ("Of course, no
matter how skilled you are, there are limits to what you can get through negotiation.").
26. Wright & Engen, supra note 16, at 29-31.
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offices, and legislative bodies.27  In this second characterization, the
prosecutor's ability to make decisions depends largely upon the
priorities and restrictions placed on the prosecutor by other actors
within the network.28 In the former, charge movement itself is morally
neutral and the normative implications depend upon whether the
prosecutor uses this tool to achieve public-oriented or self-oriented
goals."9 In the latter case, charge movement is problematic because it
deprives the charge initiation and charge negotiation processes of
transparency."°
But even in the morally problematic cases, charge movement
represents a species of backdoor bargaining that occurs in every
bureaucratic context.3' Such backdoor bargaining is inevitable in every
bureaucratic system, from dickering with a clerk at Wal-Mart over a
return policy decision to influencing presidential or gubernatorial
pardons for relatives and political supporters, because a necessary
response to any position of power is that the powerless will build their
own, countervailing source of power.3 2  And, as Charge Movement
27. See id. at 33.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 32.
30. See id. at 36.
31. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in
Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 980-81 (2006). The standard form
contracts used by the American Big-Three auto manufacturers to regulate their contracting
with their Tier-1 suppliers bear strong similarities to criminal codes. Just as line prosecutors
cannot bargain over the content of the criminal code, General Motors (GM) purchasing
agents have no authority to negotiate any changes to the thirty-one-paragraph standard
terms, instead "dickering" solely over price, quantity, warranty, and delivery terms in
individual purchase orders governed by the standard terms. See id. at 957, 965-70.
Nonetheless, Tier-1 suppliers do have bargaining power in the context of their interactions
with the GM engineers who specify the requirements for the parts the purchasing agents must
purchase. "[Olne might get the engineers to agree to 'engineering change orders' that modify
the specification of the part, enable the supplier to quote a new price (without going through
a competitive bidding process), and increase the profit on the sale of the part." Id. at 980
(also noting the practice of convincing engineers to write specifications that can be satisfied
only by that particular supplier or by negotiating side agreements for manufacturing rights to
aftermarket parts not covered by the standard terms).
32. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 73 (1983) ("The usual
and most effective response to an unwelcome exercise of power is to build a countering
position of power. . . . As so often happens in the exercise of power, the resort to
countervailing power is automatic."). As Justice Holmes opined in his dissent in Vegelahn v.
Guntner,
It is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most
superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means
combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on so fast,
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demonstrates, it is at least possible to measure the depth and distance of
downward departures between the original charge and the eventual
conviction. An intentionally more shallow criminal code might invite an
even less transparent form of backdoor bargaining than currently exists.
II. RICHARD BIRKE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
AVAILABILITY OF TRIALS
Richard Birke's article, The Role of Trial in Promoting Cooperative
Negotiation in Criminal Practice,33 explores the factors contributing to
the relatively cooperative nature of the criminal bar compared to the
cooperative (family law) and competitive (corporate) bars observed in
Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin's influential 1994 article, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
Litigation,34 and later analyses of negotiation practices in the family law
bar by Andrea Schneider and Nancy Mills.35 Specifically, Gilson and
Mnookin analyzed their respective commercial and family law bars from
a game theory perspective, ultimately concluding that the family law bar
follows a more cooperative litigation, negotiation, and settlement
model.36  They theorize that this cooperation occurs because the
relevant players in that legal market have a restricted geographic
practice area, reputation mechanisms transmit information about the
actions of parties in that bar, the parties frequently interact in repeat
transactions, and the representations involved generally involve
relatively low-stakes disputes.37 In contrast, Gibson and Mnookin's
model explains a greater degree of competitive behavior among
practitioners of the corporate bar because the parties are not limited to
practice in a specific geographic location, there is a low probability that
the parties will encounter each other again in future transactions, and
means an ever-increasing might and scope of combination. It seems to me
futile to set our faces against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the
whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental
axioms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be
changed.
44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
33. 91 MARQ. L. REV. 39 (2007).
34. 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994).
35. Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are Really Doing
When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 618-20 (2006); see also Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of
Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 147-48 (2002).
36. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 34, at 534-46.
37. See id. at 541-46.
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the representations involve high-stakes disputes and transactions.1
8
While Gilson and Mnookin's model offers some explanatory and
predictive justification for the perceived cooperative and competitive
natures of the observed bars, Birke observes that it is likely incomplete
given that the family law bar has become more competitive in the
thirteen years since the original study, despite the fact that none of the
factors supposedly contributing to that cooperative nature have changed
significantly.39 Birke proposes that the dominant factor explaining the
shift from cooperation to greater competition in the family law bar-as
well as the factor that best explains why the criminal law bar remains
cooperative-is the ready availability of trials. '  Specifically, as
caseloads have expanded-along with increased demands upon judicial
resources by priority matters such as criminal cases-the availability of
trials in the family law context has decreased. ' As a consequence,
family law lawyers have lower incentives to cooperate with their
opponents. In contrast, criminal trials, with easy access to speedy trials,
promote cooperation for all the reasons observed in Gilson and
Mnookin's original study plus the fact that either party may, at any time
in the negotiation process, determine that the benefits of the best
alternative to a negotiated plea agreement-going to trial-exceed the
expected return of additional cooperation and any reputational costs
that the attorneys may suffer. 2 Additionally, the ready availability of
trial in criminal cases promotes price transparency as a steady flow of
trials produces cheaply available public information about the "going
rate" of various charges.43
Birke's article raises interesting issues with respect to situations in
which reputation information, mutual availability of credible
alternatives to a negotiated agreement, and relative standardization of
available terms affect the relative bargaining power of the parties. First,
the ready availability of trial in the criminal context provides both
parties with significant information regarding the other's best alternative
to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). 4  In the commercial context,
parties may often communicate claims regarding their BATNAs as
threats to convince their opponents of their ability and willingness to
38. See id. at 534-41.
39. See Birke, supra note 33, at 58.
40. See id. at 83.
41. See id. at 81.
42. See id at 77-78.
43. See id. at 71-72.
44. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 97-101.
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walk away from the deal altogether. Indeed, in many situations, the
walk-away power may be the only real bargaining power that a party
possesses. The problem, of course, is that neither party in the civil
context can be sure that the BATNA threat is real or deceptive. In
other contexts, a negotiating party may choose to hide its BATNA,
particularly if that alternative is particularly low-value compared to the
possible bargain. In contrast, the parties to a criminal plea bargain
negotiation know exactly what their opponent's BATNA is. Although
there are substantial exceptions,45 the structure of the criminal plea
bargaining process either provides incentives for the parties to put their
cards on the table (and thus make visible much of their bargaining
power for assessment by the other side) or simply places those cards on
the table for them. By systemically removing uncertainties about the
parties' relative bargaining power, the criminal plea bargain process
permits the parties to assess each others' positions more accurately and
avoid unreasonable positions and contests that may cause the deal to fall
through.
Second, as discussed above, the prosecutor is really only a producer
of a limited menu of products offered on standardized terms. In many
ways, the situation described by Birke approaches a competitive market
in which producers must offer similar or standardized products on the
same set of efficient terms.46 Producers who vary terms or price away
from the "going rate" or market terms will suffer a competitive
disadvantage by either losing money on every sale or by pricing
themselves out of the market. Consequently, consumers in such a
market enter negotiations with producers aware of the market price, the
applicable contract terms, and the relative inability of the producer to
bargain away from those terms.
Likewise, prosecutors, within their jurisdictional "markets," are also
subject to substantial pressures preventing significant deviation from the
standard terms-the criminal statutes-and from the applicable pricing
menu of normal sentencing rates for particular charges. To the extent
that consumers in a prosecutorial market are aware of the going rate
and standard terms, they will be more likely to cooperate and less likely
to engage in unreasonable bargaining. The likely return on
unreasonable behavior by criminal defense counsel is unlikely to
45. Josh Bowers' Grassroots Plea Bargaining article, discussed below, explores a
systemic source of bargaining power that is largely hidden and may be based upon perception
and deception. See infra Part III.
46. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (6th ed. 2003).
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produce significant returns except in unusual cases. Moreover,
unreasonable, non-cooperative behavior imposes reputation costs upon
the unreasonable party that are unlikely to be exceeded by any possible
return from unreasonable behavior. And finally, both parties know that
the most likely response to unreasonable, non-cooperative demands is
that the opponent will simply go to trial. By removing potential hidden
or deceptive sources of bargaining power from the equation, and
circumscribing the ability of both parties to vary significantly the
standard terms and prices for particular charges, the ready availability of
trial creates incentives for cooperation that are unlikely to exist outside
of highly competitive commercial markets.
III. GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING BY JOSH BOWERS
Josh Bowers' article, Grassroots Plea Bargaining,47 is especially
intriguing to me because of its intersection with my own work on the
nature of bargaining power. Specifically, Bowers identifies a potential
new source of bargaining power with the potential to draw attention to
hidden, deceptive, and unexercised forms of power that usually fail to
register when we attempt to assess power relationships.
Bargaining power arises from a potentially infinite array of sources,
but takes only a limited number of forms. Any circumstance, whether
systemic or incidental to a particular case,48 may create bargaining
power in one or both parties to a transaction. Bowers begins with the
common perception that "plea bargaining is shaped principally by
47. 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007).
48. By "systemic" sources of bargaining power, I mean those sources of power created
by the background legal, social, political, and economic regime that tend to affect a wide
range of transactions in a consistently observable fashion. Thus, the background property
regime may systemically strengthen or weaken a seller's bargaining power in negotiating a
sale of property-in most situations, the seller receives substantial power from the fact that
other parties generally cannot force the seller to part with property against the seller's will.
Cf Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
Sci. Q. 470, 473-74 (1923). Likewise, in the criminal context, prosecutors clearly receive
bargaining strength by virtue of their authority to subject the criminal defendant to
prosecution and the risk of state-sanctioned force and violence. Defendants likewise possess
systemic sources of power by virtue of background legal rights, such as the right to a speedy
trial and to trial by jury that permit them to impose costs upon the state and the prosecutor.
In contrast, incidental sources of bargaining power comprise specific circumstances of the
transaction that arise by virtue of characteristics of the parties or external events. A
prosecutor facing re-election, for example, may feel pressure (and therefore be subject to a
bargaining weakness) to bring prosecutions that would otherwise not be sought. An innocent
criminal defendant who must support a family may be more willing to plead to avoid the risk
of jail time that would threaten the family's well-being.
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institutional pressures and cognitive errors, and hardly at all by penal
codes."4 9  Many such institutional pressures are facially obvious-
prosecutors, for example, have the ability to impose costs on defendants
without regard to their guilt or innocence." By virtue of their ability to
charge a particular defendant-and thus impose on the defendant the
costs of trial and the risks of a guilty verdict-prosecutors seem to begin
the process with an insurmountable advantage. On the flip side, of
course, prosecutors rarely have a blank check in any particular trial and
must allocate scarce state resources in deciding whether to pursue or
drop a particular prosecution. Defendants likewise suffer from well-
recognized power disadvantages in dealing with prosecutors. Many
defendants have no personal resources to fund their defenses, little
sophistication or information with respect to the plea bargain products
offered for sale, systemic and institutional pressures to cooperate and
plead rather than proceed through trial, and an extreme risk aversion of
which the prosecutor is fully aware. Even the wealthiest and most
sophisticated defendants suffer these deficiencies to some extent.
Bowers acknowledges the facially obvious factors affecting parties'
relative abilities to affect a preferred outcome in the bargaining process,
but importantly identifies a potentially new source of systemic
bargaining power that may influence both prosecutors and defendants.
Bowers focuses his analysis upon public order policing-an arrest and
prosecution paradigm in which police specifically target offenses such as
public urination, turnstile jumping, and jaywalking that, while relatively
innocuous in themselves, purportedly contribute to an overall decline of
quality of life and increase in other types of criminal activity. 1 With
little evidence of criminal activity beyond a bare police report, and with
an increasing number of first-time offenders being arrested, prosecutors
face a difficult choice. If the prosecutor brings full charges against such
defendants or extracts significant plea bargains, both the prosecutor and
the police will likely face increasing community hostility and refusals to
assist in future prosecutions and investigations. 2 On the other hand, a
49. Bowers, supra note 47, at 86.
50. The recent debacle in which North Carolina prosecutor Mike Nifong charged three
Duke University lacrosse team players with rape, despite substantial exculpatory evidence
and a lack of evidence to support the prosecution's case, illustrates the ability of prosecutors
to impose costs. See Shaila Dewan, Duke Prosecutor Is Jailed: Students Seek Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at A8.
51. See Bowers, supra note 47, at 94.
52. See id. at 87 ("By grassroots plea bargaining, I mean a systematic prosecutorial
reduction of plea prices-even in circumstances where prosecutors find such reductions
otherwise unwarranted-in order to purchase communal acquiescence to enforcement
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refusal to charge will generate friction between the prosecutor and the
police who supplied the accused perpetrator. Bowers observes that such
a system pressures prosecutors to offer relatively lenient plea bargains
that will satisfy the community and mollify the police. 3 Even innocent
defendants in this situation have a strong incentive to accept an offer of
a low-price plea, such as time served for pleading to a minor
misdemeanor offense. 4
The main thrust of Bowers' argument is both interesting and
insightful from a negotiation and bargaining power perspective. Plea
bargaining appears to be a situation in which much of the parties' power
relationship is visible, real, and exercised.5 The systemic advantages of
prosecutors are so open and obvious that, while accused defendants do
possess some capacity to affect the outcome of the bargain by offering to
spare the government the cost of going to trial, it seems likely that in
most cases defendant bargaining power will have only a marginal effect
on the outcome. Likewise, individual defendants and prosecutors may
possess incidental sources of bargaining power, but vary too greatly for
analysis. Bowers' grassroots plea bargaining potentially represents a
new systemic source of bargaining power. Moreover, the bargaining
power represented by grassroots plea bargaining pressures is not the
visible, real, exercised form of systemic power that usually comes to
mind when considering the relative bargaining strengths of prosecutors
and defendants. Rather, grassroots plea bargaining-or the community
pressures that drive such plea bargaining-represents a hidden form of
power based upon prosecutors' perception and deception of their
constituencies. 6  By drawing attention to one such hidden form of
bargaining power, Bowers implicitly forces us to recognize that there
may be other hidden, unexercised, or deceptive forms of power in the
plea agreement relationship.
policies that otherwise lack public support.").
53. See id. at 100.
54. See id.
55. Bargaining power may arise from an infinite array of potential sources, but may take
only a limited number of forms. Specifically, bargaining power may be visible or hidden, real
or deceptive, and exercised or unexercised. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining
Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 172-78 (2005) (discussing forms of power).
56. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 617 (1982) (noting the power of consumers as a group to force even the most powerful
companies to provide desired products and terms-"[t]hose helpless buyers have somehow
induced a proliferation of seller warranty experiments, and then more or less destroyed the
auto industry by their preference for foreign cars").
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Most importantly, however, Bowers' grassroots plea bargaining
model, at least in the context of public order policing, raises substantial
problems in terms of propertization of otherwise private personal
information by the state. In commercial transactions between producers
and consumers, especially in Internet-based, information-era
transactions, producers routinely track and record every datum
provided by consumers. In the commercial context, virtually everything
that a consumer does in interactions with producers is recorded so that
producers can use the resulting demographic database to create a finely-
grained picture of the individual consumer's weaknesses and strengths,
interests and disinterests, willingness to pay and when they will walk
away from a deal. 7 Once a consumer has divulged private information,
any other party may collect that information, store it, use it, and sell it to
third parties.5" And the point of all of this is to place producers in a
stronger bargaining position the next time they interact with the
individual consumers who surrendered their personal information. 9
The results of producers "propertizing" such personal information in
the commercial context are merely economic. At worst, individual
consumers will be more likely to enter bargains, more likely to spend
money, more likely to accept onerous, inefficient, or even abusive terms
proposed by the seller. And consumers themselves have the capacity to
counteract producer advantages gained through propertization of
57. See Litman, supra note 9, at 1283-84.
Almost everything each of us does seems to generate transactional
information. Walks round the block are still unrecorded, except in those
communities with cameras. Interactions that begin and end and stay
within the home are still largely unreported, although everything entering
and leaving by way of the phone lines, cable lines, satellite dishes or
wireless, non-broadcast spectrum is documented. Non-cash purchases are
memorialized and toted up. Large cash purchases are memorialized and
turned in. Cash withdrawals and deposits are recorded and saved. Visits
to the doctor, diagnoses, prescriptions, and referrals are coded and passed
along. Everything we look at on the Internet is noted and retained. All of
this information is collected, aggregated, and stored on computers.
Anyone with reason to do so can correlate the information stored on one
computer with the information stored on another, and another, and
another. The resulting dossier may be used, sold, published, or correlated
with other sources of data. In the United States, that's completely legal.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1270-72 (2005) (describing market failure with respect to
consumer property rights in private information).
59. See Barnhizer, supra note 8, at 90-92.
[91:123
2007] BARGAINING POWER IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW 141
personal information. 6" The same information tools that give producers
access to massive amounts of personal information about consumers
also permit consumers to share positive and negative experiences with
particular producers and products easily, instantaneously, and at low
cost." Producer reputation information is freely and widely available to
anyone with Internet access, as are other tools, such as brokers, buying
guides, pricing information, and third-party warranties. A consumer
who invests in developing bargaining power can counter producer
power advantages to some extent and at some cost.
In contrast, the public order policing model, even softened by the
grassroots plea bargaining observed by Bowers, still acts as an
equivalent information gathering and propertizing device. But instead
of merely giving commercial producers who own that information an
economic advantage, the public order policing model creates a broad
database on individuals-regardless of the severity of their crimes-that
is owned by the state. While a first-time offender may escape trial and
future punishment because of the pressures imposed by the community
against rigorous prosecution, the fact remains that the prosecution (and
therefore the state) retains a record of that interaction. Indeed, as
Bowers suggests, this record-generating aspect of public order policing
and grassroots plea bargaining may often be as, if not more, important
as the maintenance of civil order by arresting people for petty offenses.62
Just like commercial producers, the state can and will use the
information and records it develops from interactions with its consumers
to assist the state in closing the deal in future transactions.
Bargaining power is dynamic, both in terms of individual
transactions and systemic sources of bargaining power. The
propertization and databasing of personal information represents a
profound and long-term shift in power relationships between
60. See id. at 95-101 ("The bottom line ... is that both consumers and producers have a
wider, more robust, and more clearly defined array of bargaining power tools available than
at any time in the past.").
61. See, e.g., Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that
the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 3, 62-73 (2005) (arguing for treatment of corporate complaint websites as protected
speech under First Amendment); see also Jonathan L. Schwartz, Making the Consumer
Watchdog's Bark as Strong as Its Gripe: Complaint Sites and the Changing Dynamic of the
Fair Use Defense, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 59, 65-72 (2006).
62. Bowers, supra note 47, at 88 ("For police, order-maintenance enforcement is more
than just a way to fix 'broken windows,' it is a highly useful-albeit potentially normatively
problematic-tool to search and catalogue data about large segments of the population of
poor minority neighborhoods.").
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prosecutors as producers of arrest-processing, plea bargains, and trial-
related services and their consumer base of accused criminal defendants
and not-yet-accused community members. This shift is all the more
dangerous because it is long-term, gradual, and incremental, and
because the sources and forms of bargaining power created by such
databasing are subtle and hidden. While consumers clearly have the
ability to invest in additional increments of bargaining power in the
commercial context, such investments are not as clear in the criminal
context.
On the one hand, to some extent accused criminal consumers have
already maxed out their capacity for improving their bargaining
positions. Every criminal defendant has a right to counsel, which in the
civil context would insulate the vast majority of bargains from claims of
duress, unconscionability, undue influence, and so on. Incremental
investments in bargaining power resources, such as higher-quality
representation or more extensive discovery, may provide additional
leverage -in plea bargain negotiations. Intuitively, however, such
advantages should be mapped along a logarithmic curve, eventually
reaching a point where power will not increase significantly with
additional investment. For most defendants, access to counsel should
place them near the plateau of that curve, leaving them little room to
manipulate their power relationship with prosecutors. With the
propertization and databasing of personal information offered by the
public order policing and grassroots plea bargaining models, the state
may slowly, subtly, and inexorably shift that entire curve downward.
IV. CONCLUSION
The model of plea bargaining negotiations as bargaining over
relatively standardized terms by agents of limited authority
acknowledges that plea bargaining-like the vast majority of other types
of contracting-occurs in a standardized context that is relatively
disconnected from classical contract law and practice. Contract law and
negotiation theory have struggled for more than a century with the
question of how to integrate standardized contracting practices into
conceptions of consent, mutuality, and enforceability. With the
exploration of bargaining power in the plea bargaining context, criminal
law likewise is coming to grips with the nature of the sources of and
limitations on the parties' relative abilities to affect a preferred outcome
in their interactions. In terms of classical contract notions of consent and
bargaining, plea bargaining remains highly suspect. But viewed
properly as a species of highly standardized menu terms in a system
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where both the prosecutor and the defense counsel negotiate with an
array of complex and dynamic sources of power, criminal plea
bargaining fits perfectly with the norm of bargaining as it exists in the
real world.
* * *
